Economics

In early 2016, China introduced additional capacity cut policies to rebalance supply in the coal market to match demand that had been reduced by slow economic growth and strict environmental regulation. Ensuing disruptions to the coal market caused these policies to be revised and, subsequently, discarded as decision makers tried to find a balance between efficient supply, economic and social stability and environmental sustainability. This paper explores the causes of these unintended consequences using an extended version of the KEM-China model.

A heated debate has arisen over whether the Asian premium (i.e. higher prices in Asia than elsewhere) in natural gas trade is due to price discrimination or different market fundamentals. Determining the origin of this premium can help to guide the gas industries and policy makers in Asia, especially when the traditional oil-indexed price mechanism fades away. Using a new systemic time-series approach, this paper explores the extent to which oil prices and market fundamentals contribute to variations in gas prices in Japan, the United States, and Germany.

On June 18 2017 senior economists, policy specialists, business representatives and diplomats from Australia and China gathered in Beijing for the inaugural Australia-China Think Tank Annual Economic Dialogue, co-hosted by the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) and the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC).

This paper begins by showing that even after conditioning for factors that might justifiably lead to a country having relatively high leverage, China remains a debt outlier. In this sense, China can be regarded as over-leveraged and its debt levels may present potential risks to growth and financial stability. The corporate sector is central to China’s debt story, accounting for two-thirds of the total. Moreover, the corporate sector has been mostly responsible for China’s leverage cycles, including the leveraging up since 2008 and an earlier deleveraging phase starting in 2003.

By James Laurenceson

Note: This article appeared in East Asia Forum on October 11 2017.

1. Total foreign ownership of Australian agricultural land in terms of area (hectares) fell from 14.1 percent at 30 June 2016 to 13.6 percent at 30 June 2017.[1]

2. More than 99 percent of agricultural businesses nationwide are wholly Australian-owned. Wholly Australian-owned businesses also control 87 percent of agricultural water entitlements.[2]

The Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) welcomed John Mathews, a leading scholar on the greening of capitalism and the role that China and East Asian countries are playing in this process. Professor Mathews was joined by Professor Bruce McKern to discuss renewables, the transition to renewable energies in China and the institutional changes needed to provide industrial capitalism with long-term sustainability. Professor Mathews currently holds a Chair in Strategic Management at Macquarie Graduate School of Management.

By James Laurenceson

Note: This article was originally published in the United States Studies Centre's Debate Papers series, which includes 'The case for the US' by Jared Mondschein.

Ask the average Australian whether China or the US is Australia’s most important economic partner and you’ll likely get a bewildered look – it’s China, of course.

The cause of a Chinese hard landing could be external, such as a trade war launched by the Trump Administration. Alternatively it could be internal, such as a debt meltdown in the shadow banking system. In April a Deloitte report provided detailed insights around a scenario in which China’s GDP growth slowed from a targeted 6.5 percent this year to less than three percent.[1]  Even with the Australian dollar depreciating and the Reserve Bank of Australia cutting interest rates, the forecasts remain sobering. 

Making efforts to establish Chinese natural gas prices, China has built up two gas exchanges while opening its gas markets step by step. In view of this, this paper first studies and summarises the successful experiences of developing European gas trading hubs in the following aspects: 1. necessary conditions like market liberalization, competitive market, non-discriminatory third-party access to pipeline, regulations and reforms on the dominant market players, etc.; 2. natural conditions like domestic production, trade traditions, diversified supply, market surplus, etc.; and 3.