ACRI Facts

The Australia-PRC trade and investment relationship: 2022 timeline

December

While a change of government in Australia halfway through the year marked the beginning of a political thaw between Canberra and Beijing, the series of formal and informal trade bans put in place by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against Australian exports over 2020-2021 remained firmly in place in 2022.

This factsheet records key developments in, and statements of note about, the trade and investment relationship between Australia and the PRC in 2022. It lays out:

- significant occurrences in relation to bilateral trade;

The Australia-Taiwan relationship January 2020-June 2022

December

Australia’s position on Taiwan is laid out by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT): [1]

Australia’s Joint Communiqué with the PRC [People’s Republic of China] recognised the Government of the PRC as China’s sole legal government, and acknowledged the position of the PRC that Taiwan was a province of the PRC.

Australia-PRC trade and investment developments: a timeline

December

Note: This factsheet is a live document which will be updated as and when notable developments in trade and investment occur. It was last updated on November 8 2021.

Australia’s exports to the PRC: take away iron ore and what’s left?

December

Iron ore has long been a dominant component of Australia’s exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC). This means that even relatively small changes in the world price of iron ore can have a significant impact on the total value of Australia’s exports to the PRC. This fact sheet removes iron ore from the equation to more clearly see how other components of Australia’s exports to the PRC are evolving.

The emissions impact of Australia-PRC trade

December

This factsheet undertakes an examination of the emissions impact of Australia’s trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Trade has the potential to reduce emissions if domestic products are substituted by imported products that have lower ‘embodied emissions’, that is, greenhouse gases (GHGs) released throughout the product’s supply-chain. [1] 

An update on PRC investment in Australia

December

Investment from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Australia continues to be a topic of concern for many Australians. Polling data in 2019 showed that 68 percent of respondents thought that the Australian government is ‘allowing too much investment’ from the PRC.[1] This factsheet provides an update on the current state of play of PRC investment in Australia.

The SA-PRC economic relationship

December

A May 2020 report published by the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney pointed to demand from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – underpinned by deep economic complementarities and purchasing power – as the chief drivers of growth in Australian exports.[1] This extends to South Australia, with a prominent example of this being rapid growth in PRC consumer demand for South Australian wine.

Australia's agriculture, forestry and fisheries exports to the PRC

December

A report published in May 2019 by the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney established that Australia’s economic exposure to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is large and growing, even when exports of minerals and fuels are excluded.

Australian perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative

December

Around 130 countries have reportedly signed agreements with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in some capacity on engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since its launch by President Xi Jinping in 2013. Thirty-seven world leaders were in attendance at Beijing’s second Belt and Road Forum this year, up from 29 last year.

The Australian government on Xinjiang (October 2019 update)

December

International outrage continues to grow in the face of Beijing’s mass detention, forced indoctrination and vice-like control of its Turkic Muslim population in Xinjiang, with estimates of over a million (about 40 percent of the Xinjiang population) held in internment camps.