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INTRODUCTION

ACRI is proud to have hosted this discussion of Gough Whitlam’s 1971 visit which opened up the contemporary relationship between Australia and China. It is sad that we weren’t able to interview Gough Whitlam about China in the way we intend to interview other Australian Prime Ministers. But we are honoured to add this transcript to the many tributes to Australia’s 21st Prime Minister.

In our panel conversation, a long-term Whitlam advisor and friend, 81 year old Graham Freudenberg, recreated the tension around the visit. Mr Whitlam was Opposition Leader; he was taking a political risk in going to ‘Red China’. Mr Freudenberg, a master of storytelling, captured the sense of excitement felt by the Whitlam party encamped at the Peking Hotel. They were told to wait in the hotel for a very important announcement. The party suspected it was a meeting with Zhou Enlai. That evening they were received by the legendary Premier of China in the Great Hall of the People.

Associate Professor James Curran assisted us in putting the Whitlam visit in the geostrategic context and does justice to Gough Whitlam’s vision. Whitlam’s boldness lay in his resolve to break with the McMahon Government’s policy of waiting first for America to recognise China. But of course – and this is the added excitement and the international resonance – as Whitlam was being received, Henry Kissinger was on his way to Beijing to negotiate the momentous breakthrough of President Nixon’s opening to the People’s Republic.

Here is the transcript of our discussion, one for the historic record. None of the participants in this story – Whitlam, his companions, the Australian media – could have imagined the colossal drama and scale of China’s development since 1979, nor the interdependence of Australia and China in our time.

Bob Carr
In 2014, the University of Technology, Sydney established the Australia-China Relations Institute (UTS:ACRI) as a think tank to illuminate the Australia-China relationship. Chinese studies centres exist in other universities. ACRI, however, is the first think tank devoted to the study of the relationship of these two countries. Our work is based on a positive and optimistic view of Australia-China relations, capturing the spirit of the 2014 announcement of a Free Trade Agreement and the commitments by both countries to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

ACRI is led by Professor Bob Carr, ACRI Director and Professor of International Relations. Professor Carr is a former Australian Foreign Minister and the longest continuously serving Premier of NSW.

ACRI’s Deputy Director is Dr James Laurenceson. Dr Laurenceson has previously held appointments at the University of Queensland, Shandong University (China) and Shimonoseki City University (Japan).
Over the past 42 years, the China-Australia friendly cooperation forged by Mr Whitlam and Chinese leaders has made rapid progress.

Consul General for the People’s Republic of China, His Excellency Xuang Li

Indeed I’m so honoured. Distinguished guests, dear friends, ladies and gentlemen, good evening. This Wednesday I attended the state memorial service for the honourable Gough Whitlam at which several speakers from different circles, and Gough Whitlam’s eldest son Anthony, told stories about Gough Whitlam.
From their speeches, I further learned of Whitlam’s tremendous contributions to the economic and social development of Australia and the Australian peoples’ profound emotions towards him, which touched me a lot. Tonight I’m pleased to attend this panel discussion to hear two scholars share the stories of Gough Whitlam, recall the charm and wisdom of this great man and engrave his historic contribution to the development of China-Australia ties. Early in the 1970s, Gough Whitlam foresaw the historic trend, took the lead to visit China despite various pressures and established diplomatic relationships with China after he became the Prime Minister, and hence ushered in the new era of China-Australia ties. Recently the Xinhua News Agency held a photo exhibition in Sydney. Among the many photos exhibited, the images of his handshakes with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai keenly attracted the eyes of many visitors, including myself.

Over the past 42 years, the China-Australia friendly cooperation forged by Mr Whitlam and Chinese leaders has made rapid
progress. The annual trade volume between China and Australia has reached nearly $140 billion US dollars. Australia is China’s eighth trade partner, tenth export market and seventh import origin. China is Australia’s sixth source of foreign direct investment and largest source of international students. Australia’s investment to China reached $7.5 billion and around 3,500 Australian students are currently studying in China. China and Australia both have around 800,000 tourists visiting the other country each year. Last April, the leaders of the two countries jointly established a strategic partnership and a regular leaders’ meeting mechanism, which laid a sound foundation for the further development of our bilateral relations. When we look at these fruits, we can’t help remembering the ground-breaking contributions of Mr Whitlam.

There is also another thing I would like to mention. Yesterday Gough Whitlam’s son Nicholas told me that in the early 1970s, Gough already said, ‘We do not have to choose between China and the US’. This fully reflected his foresight and sagacity.

After the passing of Mr Whitlam, both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang sent messages of condolence, praising him as a pioneer in China-Australia relations and a good friend of the Chinese people. They believe both the Chinese and Australian people have been benefitting from the strategic decision made by Chinese leaders of the old generation and Mr Whitlam. As a Chinese saying goes, ‘Don’t forget the well-diggers when you drink from the well’. We will never forget his farsighted vision and important contributions to the development of China-Australia relations. Chinese President Xi Jinping will commence his first visit to Australia as head of state in a fortnight. We believe that with care by the leaders of both countries from generation to generation, with the strong support from personages of all circles, the big tree of China-Australia friendship and cooperation will certainly become more luxuriant and reap countless rich fruits. I think this is the best approach to remember and honour Mr Whitlam. Thank you.

Carr: Consul General Li, thank you very much for those warm and generous words. It is a delight to have you with us.
Ladies and gentlemen, ACRI, the Australia-China Relations Institute, is based at UTS. It’s the only think tank in the country devoted to the Australia-China relationship. We enjoy very strong support from the university and the Deputy Vice Chancellor Bill Purcell is with us tonight. Please make sure you get hold of our first publication, *Conflict in the East China Sea: Would ANZUS Apply?* which we released on Monday. We’ve also got a useful fact sheet on the economic links between Australia and China, a good summary, which I know the Consul General drew on when he made his remarks a moment ago. A warm thanks to King & Wood Mallesons: Mark McFarlane, thank you for allowing us these superb premises for this gathering.

We’re honoured to have James Curran here this evening. James is from the history department at Sydney University and the US Studies Centre at that university. His 2011 book *Curtin’s Empire* made a big contribution to the understanding of the wartime Labor government and its Prime Minister and their view of Australia’s place in the world. Next year he’s producing a book I think that will have you all interested called *Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War*. James, I think ACRI can sign you up for a conversation on that book.
We're honoured to have Graham Freudenberg, who is a remarkable Australian, a living national treasure. He's a superb writer – I can vouch for that: I’ve read his speeches. When my book *Thoughtlines* came out, Graham joked, “Someone said, ‘Have you read the Premier’s new book?’ I said, ‘Read it? I wrote most of it’.”

Graham was with Whitlam from 1967 and previously with Arthur Calwell, whose staff he joined in 1961 – he had a background in journalism. His book, *A Certain Grandeur*, has been invoked very often, and rightly so, as we’ve recollected Whitlam in the last few weeks. His beautiful memoir, *A Figure of Speech*, evokes Brisbane and the press gallery and Sydney. It’s a lovely, lilting Australian story. So Graham and James, let me hit you with this: what were the circumstances in which Australia was wedded to non-recognition of the People’s Republic of China. James, what is the diplomatic archaeology here?

**Associate Professor James Curran:** Following the triumph of the Chinese communists in 1949, it does seem that the Labor government of Ben Chifley was inclined to follow Britain’s lead and recognise Communist China, and initially Robert Menzies was too after that election. But at the end of 1949, he does send a cable in which he says that they are not going to recognise; they will, in the future, but not in advance of the United States. And really, from the time of the Korean War, the perception of Chinese communism as a militant and subversive threat that is sort of making its way down through Asia, like orange lava, as Gough Whitlam used to say, is the strongest, strategic
bond binding the two countries. I mean fear of China in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s is the araldite of ANZUS. It binds Australia and America together like nothing else and it underwrites the two treaties – ANZUS and SEATO, the South East Asia Treaty Organisation.

So it’s very interesting that in 1971 when Gough writes back from Beijing when he’s there, in an article for the Sunday Australian – you may have written it, Graham, I’m not sure – he actually says, ‘My journey, this journey to Beijing, started in 1954’. And of course that’s when he’s in the parliament, and delivers one of his very first speeches on international affairs, and advocates the recognition of China. Says that this is a provocation, not only to China but also to her neighbours. That’s a brave position for a politician to take at a time, as Graham has noted, when that wasn’t official Labor Party policy. It became Labor Party policy following the Federal conference in 1955, but Whitlam was on the front foot on this question from the beginning, from the time he entered parliament.

Carr: You must find that striking, that this is one of the things, one of those key policies, that Whitlam picked up and decided to run with, like his opposition to White Australia.

Graham Freudenberg: The remarkable thing that came out yesterday in numerous speeches: the development of the program for the Whitlam Government, 1972 to 1975, really began from the moment Gough entered the parliament in 1953, and the policies from as high as the recognition of China to as mundane as the national sewerage program, all developed over the years. And of course, most remarkably of all, in a ferocious political climate here, how so early he developed this, the notion of the absolute necessity because of the reality of things involved in the recognition of China, the absurdity of ignoring the existence, officially, of a quarter of the world’s people, while every day fearing and dreading the same non-existent politics.

Carr: So what was happening, if anything, on the conservative side of politics throughout the 1950s and 1960s? Was there any flicker of interest in the Menzies years in moving ahead of the Americans? Any possibility that that might have happened?
Curran: You would have to look very, very hard to find that, I think, but one thing that should be pointed out is that during the 1950s in particular, the Menzies Government did have a less ideological view of the Cold War than the Americans. Remember, of course, during the 1950s Americans treated Communist China as a pariah nation – in contemporary parlance, as a rogue state – and refused to trade with China. They refused to sanction any of their countrymen and women to travel to China, so it is a policy of complete isolation. This of course is the time when McCarthyism is rampant in the United States, Richard Nixon is a classic red baiter as Vice President during this time in the 1950s. Now, the Australian Government does trade with China in non-strategic goods in the 1950s. So Menzies was quite the opportunist – he could sprout all the rhetoric about China and Christ and the Antichrist, but when it came to trade, he could sign on the dotted line. That does change to some extent in the 1960s, when there is a much more intense and pungent ideological line coming from the Australian Government, and they oppose the recognition of China with almost irrational force. And to some extent, Evatt is in that camp as well, it should be added. But no, throughout the 1960s, in particular, the story, I think, revolves around the way in which the conservatives missed the signs coming out of Washington.
Freudenberg: I think the decisive point in the 1960s is, of course, Vietnam, because Menzies’ whole justification for our commitment to the US intervention in Vietnam in 1965 was that Vietnam is part of the downward thrust of China between the Indian and Pacific oceans, so our involvement in the war in Vietnam absolutely clinched our detestation of China, and this, of course, is what makes it all the more remarkable, that whereas Whitlam was able to advocate recognition as early as 1954, by the late 1960s, the war in Vietnam made it almost unthinkable.

Carr: There were hints of America changing. Whitlam, you told me, James, went to America on a Leader Grant. That’s a grant given out by the American Embassy to promising young politicians. They know how to pick them, because that year, it was Whitlam and Fraser – young promising politicians who got these grants to go to America. It was a big thing in those days – overseas travel wasn’t that accessible, and Whitlam apparently picked up in 1964 that there were American congressmen and officials entertaining the idea of opening diplomatic relations with China.

Curran: That’s right. He gives an interview to Channel 7 in early 1965 in which he talks about that 1964 visit. And interestingly, he and Fraser have a bit of a barney in the parliament when they come back, because Whitlam claims he was told by an American official that in Fraser’s talks with some senior State Department officials, that Fraser said they ought to drop the bomb on China. Now, Fraser refutes this but they did have a bit of a discussion in the parliament. But nevertheless, Whitlam does say in early 1965 in that Channel 7 interview, ‘America has refused to recognise China. Now, whether China should be admitted to the UN is becoming rather academic. She might want to be admitted now, but China must be recognised. And when I was in America in the middle of 1964, very prominent Americans in Congress and the administration admitted that this was so. It’s only a question of time’. So I think Whitlam was picking up on the fracturing in the United States of the Cold War consensus, and this develops more in 1965, and
especially in 1966 when there are a number of big Senate enquiries, led by Fulbright, into the relationship with China, and the Americans are starting to realise that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong are not going to easily succumb to American military power. There are Red Guards running rampant as part of the Cultural Revolution in Beijing, so there’s some early thinking going on that containment of China might not be the best policy. You know, they’re already starting to talk in 1966 about easing travel restrictions, supporting China’s entry to the UN and starting some trade. Even Lyndon Johnson in mid 1966 says, ‘We’ve got to start talking about rapprochement with the mainland’.

**Carr:** Leaping ahead to 1970, you’ve got Canada recognising Beijing and settling on a formula that accommodates Taiwan, and you’ve got, in April 1971, ping pong diplomacy, that is, an opening to the US. And in the same month, China imposing a wheat ban on Australia – very interesting – as a message about our foreign policy position, our alliance with the US and our deployment of troops to Vietnam. The prospect of losing wheat sales to China must have got the Coalition thinking. But it was an invitation, of course, for Whitlam to do something, to save the wheat trade.

**Freudenberg:** Yes, it was the wheat agreement due for renewal that put trade with China to the centre of attention, and it was on that point – it was Mick Young’s, the General Secretary of the ALP, original suggestion – that Whitlam sent a message, a cable, to Zhou Enlai as Premier of the People’s Republic, to request an invitation for a delegation – an ALP delegation – to visit China to discuss matters of trade and general interest of our two countries.

**Carr:** Yes, I’ve got the cable here. ‘Australian Labor Party anxious to send delegation’ – it’s an old fashioned telegram – ‘anxious to send delegation to People’s Republic of China to discuss the terms on which your country is interested in having diplomatic and trade relations with Australia. Stop. Would appreciate your advice whether your government would be able to receive delegation. Gough Whitlam,
Leader of the Opposition, Parliament House, Canberra. It’s addressed to Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister, Peking, China.

**Curran:** This is a very brave and audacious move by Whitlam to state the bleeding obvious. For a Labor leader – for Labor coming out of the height of the Cold War where fear of China had been a touchstone of loyalty in Australian politics – to make that move was extremely brave, and for China, still emerging from the Cultural Revolution. Now Doug Anthony – at this time said that he wouldn’t sell his soul just to benefit trade.

**Freudenberg:** His expression was he wouldn’t sell his soul – the Country Party wouldn’t sell its soul – for a mess of pottage.

**Curran:** Yes, that’s right.

**Freudenberg:** Of course, we were amazed to – surprised to hear that the Country Party had a soul.

**Carr:** Was there discussion in the Labor Party about potential risk in this, dealing with a China that was still in the middle of the Cultural Revolution – a Maoist China?

**Freudenberg:** Not at the time that the cable was sent.
Carr: But four weeks later when the invitation came from Zhou Enlai to send a delegation?

Freudenberg: Well, I myself was always quite sceptical of it. I didn’t think anything would come of it, to be frank. I didn’t think we would get a response in the first place, and then when we did, I’ll just read a little bit as to our, my scepticism about the advice – the wisdom – of such a venture. Laurie Oakes – in his *Whitlam PM* – states accurately: ‘Whitlam phoned Freudenberg at home and asked, “Do you think I should go?” Freudenberg, thinking of the political risk, answered, “No”. But on the way to the office, he changed his mind. He reasoned that the potential advantage of Whitlam being seen taking a diplomatic initiative in playing the international statesman justified the domestic political dangers which would be involved. When he got to the office, he found that Whitlam had decided to make the trip anyway and was already discussing arrangements’. And of course, my doubts evaporated entirely when Whitlam said, ‘I want you to go too’.

Carr: The response comes after four weeks – a four-week wait. It’s a big thing to actually get a response to this, given the conditions ...

Freudenberg: Yes.
Carr: ... in China at that time.

Freudenberg: When we examine the dates, the date the request was made, the date that Zhou Enlai replied, the dates that Zhou Enlai offered, an option of three dates – the end of June, early July, middle July – and Whitlam’s response, his choice of early July, from those three options – when you examine the dates, the fascinating question arises: how much did the simultaneous negotiations between Nixon, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai have to do with their offer of dates and of course, in Whitlam’s case, his choice of that early July date? Which, as things were to turn out, was absolutely central to the whole drama. And I think it is reasonable to speculate that Zhou Enlai, this supreme politician and political survivor too, certainly exuding the most power of any figure I have ever met – it’s reasonable to speculate that he saw the advantages of a leader from a non-recognising country in alliance with the United States as a preliminary, from his point of view, to the visit of the President. But this can be only be speculation. But I think, obviously a man like Zhou Enlai did nothing without a reason.

Carr: James?

Curran: It’s fascinating. Look, firstly just on the alliance dimension, and then I’ll come to the question of timing. Graham just mentioned the important point there about Australia being an ally of the United States at this time and the way in which the Chinese view that, and I’m sure we’ll come to the conversation with the Chinese Premier in a moment, but it is clear that Whitlam and the alliance dimension to this visit had two sides to it. I mean, he actually does say, ‘We go to Beijing as the first Pacific ally of the United States’ – the Labor delegation in 1971. And it’s very clear that he wants to tell the Chinese – he wants to moderate the Chinese fears of Western, and of course US, encirclement. So that’s one side of it, is to stress the positive side of American change in China policy. But the other side is, I guess, he starts to see this as a way to ease the United States’ fears about, their generational fears about China, so he’s trying to reduce American

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Laurie Oakes
fears and phobias about China as well. Now he often does slip into lecture mode and says, you know, the Americans have made a great mistake during the dullest era, he calls it, to play on John Foster Dulles’ name.

**Carr:** This is talking to Zhou Enlai.

**Curran:** Well, no, this is in his newspaper articles and some of his speeches afterwards. And on the question of timing, I mean, it is intriguing. It’s three days afterwards, isn’t it, that Kissinger arrives?

**Freudenberg:** Yes.

**Curran:** And Whitlam finds out when you’re in Tokyo afterwards, and at a dinner with the Australian Ambassador in Tokyo, the American Ambassador is present, and Whitlam says, ‘I was happy to be a pathfinder for Nixon’.
He actually says Nixon as a Republican can go further in making a settlement to China than a Liberal Democrat president who would be suspected of yielding to communism. So I’m not sure – I think that comment did get back to the White House, and there is some speculation that at the end of 1971, when Whitlam went to Washington, Kissinger and Nixon both snubbed him, and there had been a practice of Presidents meeting opposition leaders.

**Carr:** Yes.

**Curran:** But *The New York Times*, intriguingly, agrees with the timing, because it said in its obituary of Whitlam, in the first paragraph, that Gough Whitlam eclipsed Richard Milhous Nixon in going to China. Nixon would be rolling in his grave if he heard that.

**Carr:** You’ve confirmed that there was adjustment of the dates for the Whitlam visit to accommodate Kissinger’s attendance in Beijing.

**Freudenberg:** I speculate that there was an adjustment of the dates, or that the choice of the date early July was in fact put in there to allow Whitlam to take the opportunity of being there before Kissinger. And from the cables from Washington to Beijing in May and June 1971, setting up the meeting with Zhou Enlai – Henry Kissinger’s meeting – was quite a lengthy process over some weeks. But it’s clear that by the time Zhou Enlai sent his answer, his invitation to Whitlam in May – I think May 12 1971 – he knew then that Kissinger would be in Beijing about July 9 or 10.

**Carr:** Now Graham, for my generation at university, reading about the Cultural Revolution, doing a bit of Chinese history, nothing would have been more exciting than a passing into communist China. This would have been the most exciting travel experience we could have contemplated. What was it like for you?
Freudenberg: Well, I always say if a fortune teller had told me at the beginning of 1971 that sometime that year I would visit either the moon or China, I would have chosen the moon as the more likely destination.

Carr: You passed in from Hong Kong, I take it, by train?

Freudenberg: Train from Hong Kong to Canton, as it then was, Guangzhou. That was Friday 2, I think. Saturday July 3 1971, we have a flight from Canton to Beijing, a horrendous flight, five hours through storms, but very – I mean, part of the excitement. How else would you enter the …

Carr: What were your impressions of the countryside? Was it like the opera Nixon in China? Did you remark on the bare brown fields? Were you struck by poverty?

Freudenberg: There was nothing so strange about Canton itself, because it was the commercial point of contact between the west and China, even at that time. But arriving in Beijing, Whitlam’s strict
purpose was that we must not be waylaid by any tourist activities before we at least we had done some real work and achieved some real progress within the limits of being in Opposition, as we were then. So when we were installed in the hotel, at the Peking Hotel in Beijing, the officials of the People’s Institute of International Affairs, which was the body which dealt with non-recognising countries like Australia – the officials of the Institute produced an itinerary, which included, of course, a visit to the Great Wall and the Temple of Heaven, and of course, Whitlam had to say, ‘We have come here to work, not as tourists’. And that did change the atmosphere entirely, and the officials went away and came back about an hour later with a new itinerary, just for the Monday, which on the morning included interviews with the acting foreign minister and the trade minister. Now that was pretty satisfactory, that on our first working day we would see at least these two high officers. It’s now clear that we were under some, you know, they were – sizing us up, these people.

After those two very important and very satisfactory meetings, we went back to the hotel and were asked would we stay in the hotel in the afternoon, as they thought – they hoped to have – a very important announcement to make to us. And around about five o’clock, Whitlam was told that at 9pm he would meet the Premier, Zhou Enlai, at the Great Hall of the People. They asked us not to, at that stage, inform the press. We had about eight Australian journalists with us, which in one of the rare exercises of authority as Whitlam’s press secretary, that I ever exercised in my life, I had nominated the eight. Real power!

The officials would look after the press. So there we were. Whitlam was not told whether it would be a private one-to-one meeting or with other officials or what. So we all in convoy, including the press – the whole delegation and the press – that would be about 15 Australians in all – whisked off in convoy to the Great Hall of the People and sweeping out into the Tiananmen Square – this immense square, beautifully illuminated and the Great Hall itself, its great pillars with red bunting, flags down between the pillars, and this beautiful, balmy July summer’s evening in Peking. And there we were deposited in the Great Hall of the People, up the steps and into one of the large side
rooms, a room about as big as this. And already assembled are about 50 or 60 Chinese officials, and so he learned really for the first time that this is going to be a very public sort of interview, because the Australian press and we assume some representatives of the Chinese press, plus these numerous Chinese officials, and then the Premier himself enters and the meeting begins. And very few informalities; it was very much straight down to business. And together, they toured the world, as it were, but the essence of it was, of course, what a Labor government would do about recognition, its relations with China. And Whitlam almost immediately, without humming or hawing like me, said, ‘We will transfer the embassy in Taipei’ – which Harold Holt had needlessly opened – ‘We will close our embassy in Taipei and open our embassy in Peking’. And there was no parlaying about one China or two Chinas – we accepted completely the Chinese formula: there is one China and Beijing is its capital. And it is that formula on which Australia was to establish its diplomatic relations in December 1972 under the Whitlam Government and it is on that formula that Australian-Chinese relations have been conducted ever since. And that is the one unchanging basis. But when Whitlam proclaimed it in the Great Hall of the People, then the discussion went onto broader matters.

Now, Zhou Enlai very skilfully invited Whitlam to denounce the ANZUS Treaty, and Whitlam, with equal skill, avoided doing so. There was no secret, of course, about our opposition to the war in Vietnam, but Whitlam, of course, went back to Geneva in 1954 when the accords – the Geneva Accords – provided the basis for what could have been the settlement of the Vietnam question post French rule, but because of Dulles did not achieve what it might have achieved. But Whitlam was always careful – while criticising aspects of American policy, particularly Dulles’ approach and the war in Vietnam, of course – would not denounce, in any way, the American alliance.

Whitlam had pointed out that the ANZUS treaty had originally been an agreement, had been reached because of Australia’s fears about Japan, not China. The Americans in 1951 wanted a soft peace with
Japan; Australia, wrongly, wanted a harsh peace, and ANZUS was the bait with which we would sign up to the Japanese treaty. Whitlam pointed this: ANZUS had never been an aggressive treaty. Well, Zhou Enlai said, ‘Now, we have an alliance with the Soviet Union, which is in very bad shape. Do you think that your allies will be any more dependable? Reliable?’ And then Whitlam said, ‘I have to say, with respect, that there is no parallel between Soviet-Chinese relations and Australian-American relations’. And this is, I suppose, as close as Zhou Enlai ever got to hearing a putdown from an Australian.

Carr: James, what’s your comment on this remarkably interesting transcript – July 5 1971? You’ve got the first Australian leader to go to communist China sitting down with Zhou Enlai.

Curran: I think Graham’s covered it very comprehensively. The key thing is that a new relationship with China didn’t mean selling out the ANZUS alliance and Whitlam was very skilful in navigating through the trap, I think, that the Chinese Premier had set for him on that question. And it’s very interesting, the historical seminar that he gives the Chinese Premier about ANZUS’s origins. He even goes so far as to say that some in the Labor party did support the British being invited into ANZUS, which Evatt did – promised to do – after one election; he didn’t get the chance. But yes, I mean, he did wade into
domestic politics as well – US domestic politics – by saying that the Vietnam War had destroyed Lyndon Baines Johnson and if Richard Nixon wasn’t careful, it would do the same to him. And of course, this didn’t go down very well with the Americans, and certainly Billy McMahon back in Australia harped on this point and said, ‘How dare this man go and pontificate about American politics – our great ally – to this communist enemy?’ I mean, McMahon initially ridiculed the visit as instant coffee diplomacy, and after this conversation with the Chinese Premier, we know the famous comment that he made – that ‘In no time at all, Zhou Enlai had Mr Whitlam on a hook and played him as a fisherman plays a trout’. The ironic thing, though, is that McMahon writes a bitter letter of complaint to Richard Nixon about not being foretold about the China visit – keeping in mind that senior Republicans in Washington didn’t know about this.

Carr: Have you got any insider’s stuff on the reaction in the Prime Minister’s office when, after attacking Whitlam for being there, he finds out that the American President’s special assistant is there?

Curran: He’s absolutely psychotic. He’s a bundle of nerves and he’s furious at several editors of newspapers, including The Canberra Times and The Sydney Morning Herald, for publishing editorials with headlines like ‘Prime Ministerial clangers’ and things like this. I think he really loses it and on July 26 1971 – now this is after he’s written the letter of complaint to Nixon – and Kissinger calls in Plimsoll, the Australian Ambassador, and says, ‘Look, I’m really sorry but we didn’t even tell the Japanese’: McMahon scribbles on one brief: ‘But why did the Americans tell the Pakistanis?’ You know, misunderstanding the point, obviously, that Kissinger had gone through that back channel of the Pakistani President.

But in a speech to an American-Australian Association dinner in July 1971, McMahon ironically says – he talks about the ‘sweet letter’ he gets back from Richard Nixon, where Nixon tries to placate him – and McMahon actually says, ‘Look, I won’t be surprised if, in February 1972 when Nixon goes to China, Zhou Enlai will get the better of him.'
and that in turn will affect Richard Nixon’s election chances’. I mean, it is a remarkable, hypocritical comment for McMahon, who vilified Whitlam for commenting on American domestic politics in the talks with the Chinese Premier, and then does exactly the same thing.

Carr: Did that get run in the media?

Curran: It did get a run in the media, but not strongly, and in the diplomatic files, the American Consul General in Melbourne is told they believe McMahon was full when he made that speech, because the guests were so shocked that he would criticise the American President that way. Now as a sop to Australian protests, the White House does agree to establish a hotline between the White House and the Lodge in Canberra, so that they can have, you know, very intimate consultation, so that this disaster doesn’t happen again. The hotline is in existence for about 18 months, and it’s used only about five or six times and it’s only used mainly for birthday wishes.
Carr: Now, Ross Terrill, who was the Harvard academic China specialist used by the White House ...

Freudenberg: Ross was our real contact with China.

Carr: To set up the visit.

Freudenberg: To set up the visit.

Carr: So it wasn’t just the cable. You had him ...

Freudenberg: Oh no, The cable is sent and then the late, great Richard Victor Hall, one of Whitlam’s secretaries, knew Ross Terrill, and Ross Terrill was the best informed student of China during the Cultural Revolution that Australia had. He was at Harvard I think at that time. He in turn contacted, in particular, his friend Étienne Manac’h, a great French diplomat, then the French ambassador in Beijing, a great patriot of France and a great friend of China. Ross Terrill spoke to Manac’h, who spoke to Zhou Enlai, and that was it.

Carr: Why has Ross Terrill come out in recent days and said – James, perhaps you can answer this – implied that Whitlam gave away too
much in his formula, the formula we’ve just discussed, selling out the interests of Taiwan, suggesting that he might have saved the status of Taiwan. There wasn’t another formula of available, was there, given what the Canadians had done?

Curran: Well, that’s right, and he was very absolute, both at the time and then in the statements that he made when he came back to Australia, that this concept of an independent Taiwan cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the Americans making this transformative move into China and that Australia should get behind the Americans ...

Carr: This is the Whitlam line?

Curran: That’s the Whitlam line.

Carr: Which is now the American line, that quickly became the American line.

Curran: That’s right.

Freudenberg: Of course the continuing significance of the formula is that to say one China and the capital is Peking, is also, and knowingly, saying that relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Taiwan is a Chinese domestic concern. And that is the Australian official position.

Carr: Back in Tokyo, you’ve had the visit, the media’s been good, but it’s only then when you’re in Tokyo at this dinner, you hear the news that Kissinger has been there.

Freudenberg: Well, of course, the timing is exquisite, and of course, transforms what was a huge political risk. The meeting with Zhou Enlai was so successful that on any assessment it made Whitlam look good, but the sort of reactions that were going on in Australia indicate the sort of campaign that would have been waged for the next
18 months until the 1972 elections, on the basis of what Whitlam had said to Zhou Enlai. All the material’s there, but of course, suddenly there’s this astonishing announcement by President Nixon, and there are some exquisite things about the actual dates: Whitlam sees Zhou Enlai, very publicly, in the Great Hall of the People on Monday 5 July. Leaving the hall, or escorting us out, Zhou Enlai said to Whitlam, ‘You’re very young to be the leader of a great party’. Whitlam said, ‘Well, actually, I’m the same age as you were at Geneva in 1954’. And Zhou Enlai said, ‘Yes, do you remember – do you know Dulles would not shake my hand?’ That had never been forgotten, that ignorant gesture by John Foster Dulles at Geneva, wouldn’t shake the hand of the leader of the Chinese delegation. And then Zhou said, ‘So you’re 55 –’ and Whitlam said, ‘Yes, I’ll be 55 – in fact, I’ll be celebrating my fifty-fifth birthday at Shanghai next Sunday’. ‘Oh,’ said Zhou Enlai, ‘we must see that your birthday is properly celebrated’. So that was that week.

On Sunday July 11, in Shanghai, at the end of a very fine banquet given to us by the governor of Shanghai at the Peace Hotel, the waiters bring in a cake, and it is a birthday cake, and it’s inscribed: ‘With the compliments of the Premier’.

We now know at the very moment that Whitlam was consuming his cake – and you can be assured he consumed it – Kissinger was...
popping champagne bottles on the flight from Beijing to Karachi, Pakistan, from which he sent Nixon the message: ‘What we have done will shake the world’. So there you have Whitlam in Shanghai eating the Premier’s birthday cake, Kissinger happy as Larry opening champagne bottles and sending a cable to Nixon from the flight back, at the end of his triumphant but very secret meeting, ‘What we have done will shake the world’. Well, it certainly shook this little part of the world, here.

**Whitlam had articulated this sense of progressive realism in which containment and ideological confrontation and forward defence were not the sort of main springs of his foreign policy.**

James Curran

**Carr:** James, quickly put this in diplomatic context for us – how it rated in the world. I mean, this notion that China can value a relationship with Australia because we are so pro-Western; we are a strong US ally – that comes up from time to time and someone suggested the other day it might be one reason why China particularly values a free trade agreement with Australia – values the whole relationship with Australia. Motivations on the Chinese side here?

**Curran:** In 1971? Well, it’s a good question. Obviously I’d love to have access to the Chinese documents at the time to see the sort of thinking that was going on. Look, I suspect they did their homework on Whitlam and saw that he had a history of advocating recognition of China from the early 50s. I think they saw him as a progressive and I think they understood that throughout his career, Whitlam had articulated this sense of progressive realism in which containment and ideological confrontation and forward defence were not the sort of mainsprings of his foreign policy. He didn’t see the Soviet Union and China as coiled springs waiting to pounce on a vulnerable Australia. So I suspect they did their homework, got their advice, knew, I think, that Whitlam was way ahead of his own government in Australia, and I think during the discussion ...

**Freudenberg:** Well, if I might just make the point that it’s significant that Whitlam asked for this invitation as Leader of the Opposition ...

**Curran:** That’s right.
Freudenberg: But he had nearly won the 1969 election and this gave him great clout on the Australian scene, because from 1969 it was seen as almost inevitable that he would be Prime Minister after the next elections. So the Chinese, as we found out when we were there, were absolutely on the ball about everything that was happening, every detail that was happening here – would have taken that into account.

Curran: I think that’s right, and I think during the conversation, don’t they have a bit of a joke where Whitlam says to Zhou, ‘If Kissinger is coming, McMahon won't be far behind’.

Freudenberg: Zhou Enlai said that ‘Mr McMahon seems to be making some friendly remarks’, I think he said. ‘Perhaps it is because Your Excellencies’ – that’s us – ‘are here’. And Whitlam said, ‘Well, I must say this for my political opponent, he knows what is happening in the world’ – something like that – ‘and if Nixon says he is coming to China’ – you see Nixon had written an article in *Foreign Affairs* saying that he would – ‘if Nixon says he wants to come to China, can Mr McMahon be far behind?’
Curran: It’s interesting too that again, as a way of trying to placate McMahon’s wrath at not being consulted, Kissinger suggests to Plimsoll that maybe the Americans and the Australians can coordinate their election dates in 1972. Now, I don’t know why he suggested this – I think it was a bit of a sweetener to calm Plimsoll down. But the trajectory – in a diplomatic context, it is interesting, I think, when you consider the later tension between Nixon and Whitlam. But their career trajectories on China are fascinating – I mean, they are on the same page, essentially, with China at this time. They take very different routes to get there, but nevertheless there are important differences as well. I mean, for Whitlam, China is the great spark that’s going to begin a new era of Australian foreign policy and Australian engagement with Asia. It’s a way of escaping the ideological straightjackets of the Cold War, it’s a way of putting to bed the fears and phobias and the ideological assumptions which had governed, in his view, Australian foreign policy during that time. It’s another way for him to distance himself from an unpopular war in Vietnam. I mean, Whitlam is basically saying, in this period, that we have seen the end of the Cold War in East Asia. Nixon can’t say that, and he also can’t get the same distance from Vietnam, obviously. So I think in that broader diplomatic context, it’s important to consider the similarities in their trajectories, and the differences, but also the way in which they both see it as a transformative moment, but Nixon doesn’t have the same sense of – it’s not as liberating, I think, for Nixon as it is for Whitlam.

Carr: Well, that’s been a terrific discussion. On behalf of everyone here, I want to thank you both. There are some great themes here ANZUS intruding on the Australia-China relationship, the subject of our paper, released on Monday; trade, the economic relationship with China and whether politics shapes it; trade with Canada – Canada recognised China, and put Australian wheat sales under threat – that’s a theme that echoes to this day. The question whether China sees
a real advantage in dealing with Australia because Australia is so embedded in a western alliance system. These are all themes that we hope to pick over in one forum or another. I recall my first meeting with the Chinese foreign minister, then Foreign Minster Yung in Beijing, and he said, ‘Our relationship is very good but we are concerned by some aspects in Australia’s behaviour’ – and he instanced a tightening of Cold War alliances by which he meant the rotation of the American marines through northern Australia. And I was cast in what I now understand from the Whitlam transcript with Zhou Enlai in the traditional role of the Australian interlocutor in Beijing faced with a question like this. I had to explain what the ANZUS treaty was, why it was so important, why in fact it was part of the Australian DNA, but also why it doesn’t force us to choose between it and China.

Thank you for being with us tonight. Join me in thanking James and Graham for a fabulous panel discussion.
Signing of the Joint Communiqué normalising diplomatic relations: Australian Ambassador to France, Alan Renouf and Chinese Ambassador to France, Wang Guoquan
Australian Embassy, Paris
December 2 1972
National Archives of Australia
A NOTE FROM GRAHAM FREUDENBERG - TERRILL AND TAIWAN (NOVEMBER 9 2014)

Dear Bob,

Greatly enjoyed the ‘Gough in China’ Panel last week.

Re: Terrill and Taiwan

Why on earth should Gough have compromised the clarity and strength of his position on One China in 1971?

What conceivable Australian national interest would have been served?

What, anyway, is meant by ‘better terms for Taiwan’?

How has Australia been disadvantaged by Gough’s clear-cut formula, in its relations either with China or the United States, in the past 40 years?
His position on Taiwan was central, since his 1954 speech had described the American and Australian stance on ‘Formosa’ as ‘not only unrealistic but menacing’ (see A Certain Grandeur, p.201).

Let us remember:

(a) In 1971, Chiang Kai Shek still claimed Taipei as the capital of One China. Until the end of 1971, Taiwan still held the China seat in the UN Security Council.

(b) The reason why McMahon was so utterly boxed-in over China, even after the Kissinger/Nixon visits, was his position on Taiwan. Holt’s gratuitous upgrading of the Taipei consulate to an embassy in 1967 actually simplified matters for Whitlam, who was now able to say “We will transfer our embassy from Taipei to Beijing, the capital of One China, of which Taiwan is a province.”
It took Kissinger 7 months to get an acceptable wording for the Shanghai Communique, because, he writes (On China p.269) Mao baulked at a ‘bullshit communique’. Taiwan was always the stumbling block. It took the United States 7 years and three Presidents to normalise relations, until Carter adopted the Whitlam formula on the transfer of the embassy from Taipei to Beijing (see On China p.269-73, 349-51, 355-56).

I repeat: the clarity & strength of Whitlam’s position in 1971 & 1973 remains a source of clarity and strength in our relations with both China & the US in 2014 and beyond.

Warmest regards

Graham Freudenberg
WHITLAM TIMELINE

Bilateral Relations: The Process of Normalization

1954 In his inaugural speech in the Australian parliament, Gough Whitlam advocates for the normalisation of relations with China: ‘The Australian Government should have recognised the Communist Government in China, in view of the fact that all our neighbours, including the colonial powers, Great Britain and the Netherlands, have recognised it.’

1969 Anti-communist sentiment in Australia and the US seems to be softening with protests against the Vietnam War and a growing understanding of Asia. In Federal elections Whitlam achieves a 7.1 percent swing to Labor and wins 59 seats.

1970 A Gallup poll finds 49 percent of Australians want to recognise China.

1970 Canada recognises Beijing.

1971 On April 7 China imposes a ban on buying wheat from Australia, thus favouring Canada. One week later National Secretary of the ALP Mick Young suggests to Whitlam that he should send a cable to China regarding the wheat ban.

On April 14 Whitlam sends a cable to Beijing. It discusses diplomatic and trade talks but makes no mention of the wheat ban.

On May 11 after four weeks of waiting, a response from Zhou Enlai is received, an official invitation for a Labor delegation in June or July.

On May 12 Whitlam sends his acceptance letter to Zhou.
The trip begins on June 27 1971. Whitlam leads a delegation comprising ALP National Secretary Mick Young, Spokesman for Rural Affairs Rex Patterson, ALP Federal President Tom Burns, Whitlam’s Press Secretary Graham Freudenberg and China Advisor Stephen FitzGerald. They arrive in Beijing on July 3.

On July 5 Whitlam meets with Premier Zhou Enlai.

1972  Labor wins government on December 2 and concludes, with unprecedented speed, an agreement for diplomatic relations with China on December 2.

1973  Whitlam visits Beijing as Prime Minister on November 2.

After leaving office in 1975, he visits China another nine times.
FURTHER READING


Curran, James, ‘The World Changes: Australia’s China Policy in the Wake of Empire’ in James Reilly and Jingdong Yuan (eds.), *Australia and China at 40*, (pp. 22-43), University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2012


FitzGerald, Stephen, *The Coup that Laid the Fear of China*, The Whitlam Institute, University of Western Sydney, 2010


Freudenberg, Graham, *A Figure of Speech: A Political Memoir*, John Wiley & Sons, Milton, 2005


Oakes, Laurie, *Whitlam PM*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973

THE PANELLISTS

Professor the Honourable Bob Carr is Director of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology, Sydney, a think tank focused on Australia-China relations. He was Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs from March 2012 to September 2013. He is also the longest continuously serving Premier of New South Wales, holding office from 1995 to 2005. Bob Carr is the author of Thoughtlines (2002), What Australia Means to Me (2003), My Reading Life (2008) and Diary of a Foreign Minister (2014).


Associate Professor James Curran teaches history at the University of Sydney and is research associate in the history of the US-Australia alliance at the US Studies Centre. He is the author of The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image (2004), shortlisted for the Victorian Premier’s Literary Awards and the New South Wales Premier’s History Prize, The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire (2010), co-authored with Stuart Ward and shortlisted for the Prime Minister’s Australian History Prize and Curtin’s Empire (2011). A Fulbright Scholar at Georgetown University in 2010, in 2013 he was the Keith Cameron Professor of Australian History at University College Dublin.